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ON THE SECURITY RISKS OF THE BLOCKCHAIN 
 
ABSTRACT 
The adoption of blockchain technology is taking place at a fast pace. Security features 
inherent in blockchain make it resistant to attack, but they do not make it immune, and 
blockchain security risks do exists. This paper details the associated risks and concerns of the 
blockchain. We explore relevant standards and regulations related to blockchain and survey 
and analyse 38 blockchain incidents to determine the root cause in order to provide a view of 
the most frequent vulnerabilities exploited. The paper reviews six of these 38 incidents in 
greater detail. The selection is made by choosing incidents with the most frequent root cause. 
In the review of the incidents, the paper details what happened and why and aims to address 
what could have been done to mitigate the attack. The paper concludes with a 
recommendation on a framework to reduce cyber security risks when using blockchain 
technologies.   
Keywords: security; standards; blockchain; root cause analysis; security recommendations 
INTRODUCTION 
The Blockchain technology was devised by Satoshi Nakamoto, the designer of Bitcoin, set 
out in a white paper in 20081. The technology created a Ôpeer-to-peerÕ online cash system, 
whereby a third party, such as a financial institution, was no longer needed. The benefits of 
using such a technology are transparency, authenticity and auditing as it takes away the need 
for trust between two parties participating in a transaction2.  
Since the inception of the Blockchain, several hacks and attacks have occurred, bringing into 
question the security of the technology. The causes of these incidents range from smart 
contract vulnerabilities3, application vulnerabilities4, cloud infrastructure/server breach5, 
insider breaches to social engineering breaches6. Some of the causes are not publicly known. 
A study performed by Luu et al.7 discovered that 8,833 out of the 19,366 existing Ethereum 
contracts are vulnerable. Atzei et al.8 analysed the security vulnerabilities of Ethereum smart 
contracts, and provided a taxonomy of common programming pitfalls that may lead to 
vulnerabilities, Zimba et al.9 investigated crypto mining attacks by examining malware code 
and suggested mitigations, while Li et al.10 analysed the vulnerabilities in Blockchain systems 
and compiled a list of security risks to Blockchain systems. 
Yet current research places an imbalanced focus on the technical aspects of Blockchain. 
There is limited work in regulatory frameworks, Blockchain standards and best practices. 
Presently, businesses and organisations operate under a lack of standards, where there is 
currently only one in development11. This creates legal liability issues as Blockchain systems 
often run on cloud platforms and integrate with 3rd party applications, notably in a public and 
consortium driven type12, and to date it is unclear how legal liabilities are determined if 
Blockchain incidents do occur. Therefore, there is a need to understand and identify the 
applicability of the existing standards and regulations that are connected to Blockchain. 
Ideally, organisations learn lessons from previous incidents. Public information sharing is 
necessary at the earliest opportunity. This also allows new industries adopting the technology 
to learn from other communities, as despite their reasons for using the Blockchain may be 
different the vulnerabilities remain the same. Although some incidents are publicly known, 
the information is not always complete or accurate. As a result, organisations cannot 
effectively benefit from the mistakes of others, since there doesnÕt seem to exist a procedure 
to properly document and report incidents. However, experience can be borrowed from the 
general cyber security area related to the incident response (IR). A complete IR lifecycle 
encompasses incident identification, notification, analysis, containment, mitigation, incident 
learning and dissemination, where lessons learned are cycled back to the incident 
identification stage of the IR lifecycle13. 
In this paper we identify current security and other standards that may be pertinent for the 
blockchain technology. Through the examination of existing cases of security breaches based 
on a root cause analysis approach, we analyse Blockchain security incidents with a focus on 
standards, information governance and regulatory frameworks. This analysis informs a set of 
recommendation on what a cyber security blockchain framework should include and have 
implications for the creation of the Blockchain specific security standard.  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
ÔBlockchainÕ or ÔBlockchain technologyÕ is seen as the backbone of the Bitcoin protocol, and 
as an online, distributed and publicly available ledger that is updated by the nodes of a peer-
to-peer (P2P) network, based on consensus, without the mediation of a trusted third party, 
where all transactions are secured by cryptographic means14. The blockchain is essentially a 
very restricted data structure, which is open, public and append only.  
It contains all transactions ever made within ÔblocksÕ, each of which contains groups of 
transactions, linked together based on cryptography rules15. Regardless of whether the 
transactions are purely financial or not, the underlying mode of operation is always the same 
(Figure 1). First a transaction request is made and broadcasted across a network of peers. This 
could be a contract, an update of a record, a financial transaction or anything that is 
transactional information. The nodes check the validity of the transaction through a process 
called mining, trying to solve a very difficult computationally-wise mathematical problem, 
which is resource-intensive, and then broadcast the solution to the other miners for 
confirmation. Once confirmed, the original miner is rewarded in bitcoins for their effort and 
the transaction itself is then added into a confirmed block. This block is timestamped and 
linked to the previous block, because the very solution to the mathematical problem is based 
on the unique cryptographic signature (hash) of the previous block. This means that all blocks 
are linked together in sequence, i.e., there is a clear and unique path from block 0 all the way 
to block n16. 
 
Figure 1. How the Blockchain works. 
 
As blocks are identified, miners add them in their local copy of the blockchain and broadcast 
them to the network. The rest of the miners, when they receive the information about this 
newly identified block, they validate it (which is not resource-intensive like mining), and 
assuming that the information is indeed validated, i.e., the solution to the mathematical 
problem is correct, then they also update their local copy of the blockchain. As a result, all 
miners across the network have access and maintain to the same copy at all times15. 
Blockchain Typology based on access rights 
Blockchains can be categorised in different ways. Okada et al. propose their classification 
based on the existence or absence of a trusted authority with certain control over the chain, 
and the existence or absence of incentives in the form of an operational market around the 
blockchain system17. Equally, other classifications have to do with the permission rights and 
the ownership of the chain, or the degree of decentralisation and the computing approach for 
service delivery (peer to peer or cloud-based). One can identify three main types of 
blockchains: public, private and consortium-driven. Public blockchains are permissionless 
and anyone can send transactions as well as participate in the process of deciding whether a 
given block gets added to the overall chain. In addition, third parties and intermediaries are 
not needed, or needed to be trusted. Private and consortium blockchains are both types of 
permissioned chains. In a private blockchain, one organisation owns the ÔwriteÕ permissions. 
ÔReadÕ permissions can be made available to the public or trusted others if necessary via the 
authorisation of the owner organisation. As a result, private blockchains are permissioned and 
need somebody trusted for the chain to operate18. This is ideal for database management or 
auditing within a single company. In a consortium blockchain, the validation process is 
controlled by several pre-selected nodes19. For example, the rules of the blockchain may be 
that two banks and a regulator must sign each block for it to be added. Again, the right to 
read the blockchain can be made public if required and consortium-based blockchain can be 
thought of as partially decentralised20. 
 
RISKS AND CONCERNS IN THE BLOCKCHAIN ERA 
Blockchain technology provides opportunities for businesses to improve efficiency and 
reduce costs, however, inherent risks must be considered and understood by firms. In this 
section we present an aggregation of these risks based on the classification of permissionless 
and permissioned chain risks. 
Permissionless blockchain 
Currently, more than half of the networkÕs processing (hashing) power rests in a single 
countryÕs hands, namely China21, thanks to cheap energy and loose regulatory frameworks 
about emissions22. This could lead to the possibility of collusion and threaten the democratic 
nature of a public blockchain23. The Chinese government has begun banning some 
conversions between virtual currencies, such as bitcoins24, and cracking down on mining, in 
an attempt to reduce power shortages25. Such an outcome may very well push mining pools 
to move to alternative countries with less regulated environment and equally cheap 
electricity, shifting the balance and making another country the leader in mining and hashing 
power. However, the problem of one country being dominant over the network would still 
persist26. 
The strength of the Bitcoin protocol is that it is open source, and publicly available to 
everyone, meaning that everybody can examine the code. However, this is a double-edged 
sword: upon identifying a weakness in the code, one may alter the network, but equally, may 
be less benevolent and choose to exploit the unknown security vulnerabilities through a zero-
day attack27. Another threat is that of time jacking attacks28. Time jacking is initiated when an 
attacker announces an inaccurate timestamp for a block. As the attacker is connected to other 
nodes, they may accept this inaccurately timestamped block, and as a result the network time 
counter speeds up for the majority of the miners. In essence, there will be a fork created for 
the blockchain, with miners adding new blocks in a longer chain which has been tampered 
with. The consequence is that there are opportunities for double-spending, i.e., the same 
cryptocurrencies spent more than once. In addition, it would lead to wasting valuable 
computational resources during mining, as benevolent miners will be mining for the 
counterfeit chain15. 
Next, a risk that pertains to cryptocurrencies has to do with their storage. In fact, the most 
popular mode of storage for crypto-currencies, i.e., online and mobile cryptowallets, are quite 
insecure. A cryptowallet is a collection of private keys and several users today store their 
private keys in internet based, and thus hack-prone, wallets29. The best practice is generally to 
avoid using such ÔhotÕ wallets and instead use cold storage, such as USB Drives, offline 
wallets or even paper-based wallets documents. It is worth mentioning, however, that even 
these practices have security weaknesses30. For this reason, there are studies that attempt to 
provide more secure and more reliable approaches to cryptocurrency storage29. 
Within a permissionless environment, all the peers of the network are equally responsible. As 
a result, should there are losses due to e.g., a failure in the code, the legal liability is 
undetermined and nobody is held accountable or responsible. What this means is that there is 
no way to recover the said losses31. This is further exacerbated by the fact that, to date, the 
question of whether cryptocurrencies are money, commodities or something else is still 
unresolved, and as such, remain fairly unregulated with regulatory bodies, institutional 
mechanisms and the likes, removed from the payment and storing process. In addition, 
regulatory and legal frameworks often necessitate the application of some additional layers of 
control, which, in the case of the Bitcoin, may not be applicable or feasible32. 
Permissioned blockchain 
Permissioned blockchains offer a more controlled environment for transactional information. 
a permissioned environment, the blockchain is developed, used and controlled by a group of 
participants, or a consortium. As a result, in such cases, trust exists within a set number and 
identified parties, and the central assumption that the chain must remain operational and 
trusted still holds. However, as in the case of a permissionless chain, the novelty of the 
technology, coupled with the limited (controlled) number of peers being able to see the code, 
suggests that the code may be insufficiently tested, and the risk of unidentified bugs and 
vulnerabilities is even greater, and therefore, more prone to malicious attacks and system 
errors33. 
Permission is granted by the governing parties. These operators need to grant permissions to 
trusted nodes, who will then take care of the verification process. This means that a risk 
emerges as a result of granting incorrect permissions. Furthermore, it is expected that there 
will be fewer nodes responsible for maintaining the network. As such, a single node that 
restricts the transmission of information, transmits incorrect information, or simply goes 
offline due to technical issues, suggests that each and every node holds greater responsibility 
for the health of the network, and that of the chain34. 
Next, some risks of permissioned blockchains relate to their interoperability. It is only natural 
that each private, permissioned blockchain will operate using a different protocol, and that 
their implementation will be different. This will result in different models for data and data 
storage, permission controls and obviously confidentiality. In turn, such differences can lead 
to complications as the fragmented nature of data residing in private blockchains will make 
them impossible to later link together35. 
However, we consider that the most critical risk for permissioned blockchains surfaces as a 
result of using third-party applications. Despite that the blockchain has been proposed as a 
solution towards increasing the security of cloud-based applications and alleviate any 
vulnerabilities36, it is still sensitive to attacks and as secure as its weakest point, which is, in 
this case, the third-party provider. Most firms and organisations turn to specialised external 
providers in order to leverage their expertise and build their IT solutions. When IT is 
outsourced partially or entirely to an external vendor37, the security of the blockchain will be 
no greater than the trustworthiness of the chosen vendor. If the vendor has weak security in 
their own systems, then these will affect the organisation as well and may result in exposing 
data, credentials and keys to unauthorised entities. 
Finally, like other technologies, the blockchain operates within a less controlled environment, 
standards-wise. The lack of standards suggests that each company, consortium or services 
operates using a different set of rules. In addition, the blockchain is rarely used on its own; 
instead, it is often coupled with other concepts and technologies, such the internet of things, 
cloud computing etc. As a result, it may be unknown what sorts of risks actually exist at the 
intersection of such technologies, as there doesnÕt exist a common framework for developing 
and implementing any single security management practice for blockchain and decentralised 
applications, nor that there is some baseline approach for maintaining minimum controls over 
the blockchain solutions. In other words, blockchain developers cannot benefit from the 
mistakes of others, as there doesnÕt exist a protocol for documenting and reporting 
incidents38. 
MAPPING THE BLOCKCHAIN AGAINST SECURITY STANDARDS  
In this section, we document existing standards and regulatory frameworks that relate to 
information security and areas, within which the blockchain seems particularly popular (such 
as finance and healthcare). We do so in an effort to better understand what the lack of 
standards may possibly mean for security purposes, as well as to later draw some 
recommendations, in the form of guidelines for developing blockchain-based applications. 
Most importantly, we further identify the applicability of the existing standards and 
regulations with respect to areas of interest within the blockchain.  
Table 1 provides a summary of standards and regulatory frameworks that are pertinent to the 
Blockchain technology. We present the standards and regulatory frameworks that relate to the 
Blockchain technology, without having been developed specifically for it. Within this group 
there are different standards, regulations and acts that blockchain platform providers should 
consider for industry specific compliance requirements. For example, it includes FIPS 140-2, 
which details the necessary security guidelines for a cryptographic module and elaborates on 
the security and storage of cryptographic keys, which are relevant for blockchain 
applications39. Similarly, the Computer Misuse Act has been put together in order to protect 
IT artefacts from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which can affect the 
blockchain40. There are several standards and regulations that can be applicable within the 
blockchain context. However, arguably, the most important one is the newly introduced 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is counterintuitive to the append-only 
nature of the blockchain. However, following GDPR if an individual demands the deletion or 
amendment of their personal data, the firm needs to comply41.  
The next group of standards and regulations pertain to areas that exhibit an interest about the 
technology, such as the financial and the health sectors. Within these two contexts, the 
blockchain can support increased compliance and provide the necessary monitoring tools. 
Some of the relevant regulations are naturally the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, where the 
blockchain can assist companies with the traceability and the appendability (but not 
amendability and deletion) of records. Equally important is the Health Insurance portability 
and accountability act, which details the importance and the processes for maintaining 
security and privacy. Within the finance sector, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999)42 
requires that financial institutions are transparent as far as information sharing is concerned 
and further documents the responsibility of the said institutes for safeguarding such data. In 
such cases, the blockchain has the potential to assist with compliance with the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley act, since it is a secure ledger that monitors and documents all transactional 
requests. 
Currently no standard has been designed and introduced specifically for the blockchain 
technology, with the exception of ISO/TC 307, which presently is still under development. Its 
aim is to bring together different elements of the blockchain and to standardise distributed 
ledger and blockchain technologies (smart contracts, governance and interoperability 
issues)11. 
Table 1. Description of pertinent existing standards and regulations 
Standard/Regulation/Act Description/Coverage/Aim Relation to blockchain 
Relevant for Blockchain-based products and services 
Federal Information 
Processing Standards 
(FIPS 140-2)39 
Security needs for a cryptographic 
module. Published in 2001 and updated 
in 2002.  Specific to United States of 
America. 
Cryptographic keys are a critical 
element of blockchain technology.  
FIPS-140-2 looks at security and 
storage of such items. 
Computer Misuse Act 
(1990)40 
United Kingdom legislation to protect 
computers from purposeful attacks and 
the theft of information. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks on blockchain platforms as 
well as theft of cryptographic keys are 
examples of blockchain related items 
covered by the act. 
PAS 555 2013 Cyber 
Security Risk Governance 
and Management 
Specification43 
 
International all-inclusive framework 
for cyber security, setting out technical 
requirements as well as physical, 
behavioural and cultural elements. 
Not designed specifically for 
blockchain but can be applied. 
IEE std c37.240-201444 International cyber security 
requirements for substation 
automation, protection and control 
systems. 
Not designed specifically for 
blockchain but can be applied. 
Common Criteria for 
Information Technology 
Security Evaluation (CC 
v3.1)45 
International standard that removes 
redundant evaluation activities that do 
not contribute significantly to the final 
assurance of a product  
Not specific to blockchain, but 
applicable when building blockchain 
based applications or products. 
Federal Information 
Security Management Act 
2014 (FISMA)46 
Comprehensive framework to protect 
government operations, assets and 
information from threats. This is 
United States federal law. 
Not directly related to blockchain, but 
applicable when looking at aspects of 
information security. 
ISO/IEC 27001:201347 International information security 
management standard that defines best 
practice for an information security 
management system. 
Can be applied to blockchain 
technology since it can be thought of 
as a security management system. The 
standard could be applied to any part 
of a business. 
! ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
2700548 
Supports implementation of ISO/IEC 
27001. 
As with ISO 27001 it can be applied to 
blockchain but is not tailor made. 
General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)41 
Synchronise European data privacy 
laws, as well as to protect and 
empower all EU citizens data privacy.  
Enforceable from 25th May 2018. 
GDPR says that people can demand 
that their personal data is rectified or 
deleted under several circumstances.  
This must be a key consideration for 
blockchain technology where personal 
data is used as it is essentially a 
growing record with a traceable 
history.  Therefore, GDPR compliance 
could be a barrier. 
ISO/IEC 27017:201549 Information technology, security 
techniques and code of practice for 
information security controls based on 
ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud services. 
Directly related to cloud technology 
which blockchain platforms can be ran 
on. 
ISO/IEC 27018:201450 Information technology, security 
techniques and code of practice for 
protection of personally identifiable 
information (PII) in public clouds 
acting as PII processors. 
Specific to PII on Cloud services. 
Blockchain platforms can be run on 
cloud services. 
Regulations that affect areas that can benefit by Blockchain technologies 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX)51 
 
Reform corporate financial reporting 
and accounting. This is United States 
federal law. 
Blockchain has the potential to assist 
companies with compliance to SOX 52 
Health Insurance 
Portability and 
Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA)53 
Security and privacy of specific health 
data to ensure its protection.  This is 
United States federal law. 
Blockchain has potential to assist with 
HIPAA compliance, improving patient 
care as well as operational efficiency 
in the healthcare industry 54 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(1999)42 
United States Act that requires 
financial institutes to be clear with 
their information sharing practices and 
details the responsibility of the 
organisation to safeguard sensitive 
data. 
Blockchain has potential to assist with 
compliance to the act. If crypto 
currency exchanges get classified as 
financial institutions, then they would 
also be obliged to adhere to the cyber 
security policies and procedures within 
the Act 55. 
Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standard 
(PCI DSS) (2004)56 
The standard developed consists of 
twelve requirements created to 
improve cardholder data security. 
Applicable should financial 
institutions look to move cardholder 
data onto blockchain networks. 
Directly related to the Blockchain 
ISO/TC 307 (In 
development)11 
Standardises distributed ledger and 
blockchain technologies.  There are 
currently 8 ISO standards in the 
development stage under ISO/TC 307. 
!! Directly related to blockchain, but it is 
not yet completed.  Will cover aspects 
including Smart contracts, governance 
and interoperability. 
 
CASE STUDIES: ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
INCIDENTS IN THE BLOCKCHAIN ERA 
This section analyses the blockchain-related incidents using the case study method57. We 
review publicly available incidents and perform an in-depth analysis of six representative 
cases out of 38 known incidents. Table 2 presents an overview of our findings. Our aim is to 
support potential adopters to learn from existing errors and avoid similar pitfalls with this 
technology that is still in its infancy. 
Table 2. Blockchain Incidents Root Causes and Requirements for prevention 
Incidents Incident Type What are the root causes? What is required to prevent the 
incident? 
The DAO58,59  Application 
Vulnerability/ 
Smart Contract 
Code Error 
Software vulnerability in the 
ÔsplitÕ function, allowing 
hackers to run split multi-times 
to drain the DAO of its value;  
Poor design of the smart 
contract  
Peer-review and testing of code 
before deployment 
Smart contract audits by 
independent testing facilities 
Bitfinex58  Server/Infrastruct
ure Breach 
Key parties of the multi-
signature key management 
system blindly signing off 
transactions!
Systematic controls to prevent and 
detect analogous transactions;  
End to end security review using 
scenarios 
Coindash60,61 Server/Infrastruct
ure Breach 
Coindash website hack resulting 
in Ethereum address changed to 
the hackersÕ wallet address 
Suspicious malicious insiders 
Web-based attack detection and 
prevention 
Defence against malicious insiders 
Parity61,62 Application 
Vulnerability/ 
Smart Contract 
Code Error 
Smart contract vulnerability in 
the library code;  
Code containing self-destruct 
function;  
Restructured code (light 
version) not reviewed  
Smart contract code review and 
audits;  
Formal procedures and tooling for 
testing complex live smart 
contracts 
Zerocoin63,64 Application 
Vulnerability/ 
Smart Contract 
Code Error 
A programming error (Ô==Õ 
being used instead of Ô=Õ) 
allowing an attacker to duplicate 
serial numbers and generate 
multiple spends  
Routine code reviews and internal 
and external audits;  
Formal agreements and automated 
procedure in emergent blockchain 
incident handling 
Inputs.IO 
Hack65,66  
Cloud Platform Cloud infrastructure break;  
Email accounts compromise 
allowing the attackers to reset 
the server password 
Digital wallets breach 
Cloud platform security 
protection;  
Digital wallets risk management;  
Considering cold storage for 
storing keys and crypto currency 
 
An overview of blockchain security incidents 
We identified and reviewed 38 incidents with the aim to recognise the main root cause (Table 
3, Appendix). We classified them into seven root cause categories (Figure 2). The 
classification is adapted from Li et al.Õs10 classification of Blockchain security causes, 
enriched by adding insider threat dimensions that have attracted the attention of the 
community67. Half of the incidents occurred due to server or application related 
vulnerabilities. Others related to insider threats, protocols, and the cloud platform the 
blockchain ran on. For some incidents, the root causes are still unknown.  
 Figure 2. Root Cause Analysis 
We selected six incidents for in-depth analysis. The selection is based on the frequency of the 
root cause. In particular, we look at the issues of server/infrastructure incidents, application 
vulnerability/smart contract incidents and cloud platform incidents, which account for over 
60% of the total number of incidents. The selection also considers the comprehensiveness 
and reliability of the information sources regarding the incidents. The selected incidents are 
well documented with enough details to analyse and are from reliable sources such as peer 
review publications (see Table 2). In what follows we explore the root causes of blockchain 
incidents in more detail and discuss how they could have been prevented. For each incident, 
the following questions are addressed: What happened and how? Could damage have been 
reduced or mitigated and how? 
Case 1: The DAO (Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error) 
In June 2016, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (The DAO) had US $50mn 
stolen58. The DAO was a venture capital fund in the cryptocurrency software industry and 
had no leader or board and was not associated with any country. The aim of The DAO was to 
deliver a new business model for organising enterprises. It was a virtual organisation initiated 
within a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain.  The contract maintains a rule set that 
allows the capability for contributors to vote on which ventures and projects to fund using the 
cryptocurrency Ether. Participants who contributed larger amounts during the creation of the 
DAO are given a proportionally larger number of votes. Once a vote is completed, the Ether 
cryptocoins are distributed to the ventureÕs cryptowallet and the transaction is recorded on the 
Ethereum blockchain. 
The attack that occurred was facilitated by a software vulnerability identified in the ÔsplitÕ 
function.  The function was created to let participants of the DAO perform a balance transfer 
into what was called a ÔChild DAOÕ, essentially a new DAO, should they want to move their 
investments following a vote. The process was as follows; the network confirms the 
participants account balance, then transfers it to the new DAO, only then is the balance in the 
original DAO set to zero. This in practice was working correctly, however it was determined 
that participants could execute another ÔsplitÕ before the balance was set to zero, and hence 
perform the same split multiple times to drain the DAO of its value.  In the incident a split 
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was executed nearly two hundred times by the hackers. The attack took advantage of the way 
the blockchain works and of the poor design of the smart contract.  
This type of attack could have been avoided had the smart contract code received an 
exhaustive formal review and assessment before being implemented. The DAO was delisted 
from trading on the major exchange Poloniex in September 2016 and Kraken in December 
201658. This case raises questions around the lack of safeguards in place to ensure blockchain 
technology is utilised correctly.  
Case 2: Bitfinex (Server/Infrastructure Breach) 
In August 2016, nearly 120,000 Bitcoin (over US $60mn at the time) were stolen from 
Bitfinex58. Based in Hong Kong, Bitfinex is one of the worldÕs largest digital and 
cryptocurrency exchanges. Bitfinex operated several security measures, which included a 
multi-signature key management system that split private keys for each customerÕs wallet 
between several parties with the aim of reducing the chance of a successful breach.  In this 
specific case, one key was secured by the third party BitGo, a wallet provider, whilst further 
two were maintained internally by Bitfinex. To make a transaction all three keys would be 
required.   
There was much debate as to whether the breach was the fault of Bitfinex or Bitgo, however, 
regardless of where the root cause lay, systematic controls to prevent and detect analogous 
transactions put into place by either party could have helped lessen the losses sustained. For 
example, controls that would prevent Bitgo from signing off a transaction simply because 
Bitfinex had. Bitgo reported no breaches but came under fire for blindly signing off 
transactions58. 
The incident exploited security vulnerabilities within individual organizations. The 
blockchain network itself remained fully functional and operated as envisioned.  The incident 
may have been prevented had there been a detailed end-to-end review of security, using 
scenarios, meaning there would have been a higher chance of identifying risks up front and 
being able to mitigate them at that point. 
Case 3: Coindash (Server/Infrastructure Breach) 
In July 2017, over seven million US dollarsÕ worth of Ethereum cryptocurrencies were stolen 
by hackers from investors in the Israel-based start-up CoinDash60. CoinDash considers itself 
as a platform for managing and trading crypto assets. People buy virtual tokens from 
CoinDash, as these tokens are supposed to increase in value as the start-up 
grows.  Unfortunately, CoinDash suffered a hacking attack during its Token Sale event, and a 
fake twitter account (@Coindash_ico) was set up to promote the Token Sale.  
The attack occurred during the initial coin offering; the Ethereum address where investments 
should have been sent was changed to the hackersÕ own wallet. This was executed by the 
attackers hacking the Coindash website. The victims were refunded; however, the criminals 
were not identified which is a common occurrence in blockchain related incidents61. The theft 
was believed to have been initiated by an insider. However, necessary protection on the 
website, such as network-based threat detection and mitigation68 could have prevented this 
attack. In addition, monitoring for malicious insiders could have reduced the likelihood of an 
insider breach69. 
Case 4: Parity (Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error) 
In November 2017, a smart contract vulnerability in the library code, deployed as a shared 
component of all multi signature wallets provided by Parity Technologies was identified by 
an anonymous user62. The user was able to make themselves the owner of the library 
contract. The component was then destroyed, freezing funds in 587 wallets holding over 
$500,000 in Ether as well as other tokens.  
The original multi-signature wallet was created and audited by EthereumÕs DEV team, Parity 
Technologies and others in the community. The code went through an extensive peer review 
and still showed no known security vulnerabilities. However, the Parity team restructured the 
code into a lightweight version that was getting deployed every time a new wallet was 
created together with a heavier version known as the library element, which was deployed 
just once and contained most of the logic. When doing this, only few changes were made to 
create the lighter code and the library code. This meant the library contract still had similar 
functionality as a regular wallet and required initialisation and still contained the function 
Ôself-destructÕ that was supposed to be used for retiring the wallet. No formal audit was made 
of this library code. Following the attack, the library contract was fixed and re-deployed the 
next day. 
Parity Technology suggested that if the code had not contained the self-destruct function and 
someone had taken ownership of the library by initialising it (as seen in the actual attack), 
then there would be no further vulnerability to exploit. The other option would have been for 
the wallet initialisation to be done automatically through the code change and redeployment 
or manually when the contract was first deployed so that Parity became the owner. Either 
way, the vulnerability is that the code was used for a purpose other than that for which it was 
audited. 
Parity Technologies believes that more extensive and formal procedures and tooling around 
the deployment, monitoring and testing of contracts will be needed to achieve security. This 
is of greater necessity when the number and complexity of live contracts is growing62. 
Case 5: Zerocoin (Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error) 
In February 2017, a programming error in the Zerocoin implementation was exploited, 
allowing an attacker to generate multiple spends they could send to an exchange, which were 
then sold and withdrawn63. The Zerocoin protocol consists of minting and spending. Minting 
a coin means making a coin no longer spendable by ÔburningÕ it. Spending a Zerocoin means 
redeeming a new coin that has no transaction history. To prove that one is eligible to spend 
Zerocoin, they must demonstrate that they have minted an equivalent number of coins. The 
proof only shows that one burnt coins not whether these coins have been redeemed. A unique 
serial number is generated during the mint phase and posted during the spend phase. Miners 
verify that the serial number has not been used before and it was this validation phase where 
the bug lay. In this case, the company identified that the total Zerocoin spent did not align 
with the total Zerocoin minted during a check to monitor usage. The spent tally in fact far 
exceeded that of the mint tally. The development team identified that a serial number for a 
spend transaction had been re-used. The duplicate serial numbers should have been rejected, 
instead the hacker manage to exploit the single proof. 
Investigation by developers revealed that the issue was Ô==Õ being used instead of Ô=Õ.  The 
double equals is a comparison operator, returning a true or false value whereas the single 
equals makes the first parameter equal to the parameter/value after the equals. This allowed 
to break the serial code validation. The attacker was immediately sending the created spent 
transactions to an Altcoin exchange address. Zerocoin then attempted to work with Altcoin to 
freeze the accounts, however it was too late as the funds had already been sold and 
withdrawn.  Over sixty accounts were used to make it difficult to detect what was happening.  
Zerocoin contacted major mining pools asking them to suspend processing any Zerocoin 
transactions. Some pools were slow to react, resulting in further Zerocoin spent transactions 
being completed in this windo63. 
This case highlights the importance of routine code reviews as well as internal and external 
audits. Automated checking systems could also be used to detect exploits as early as possible. 
There was also no formal process or agreement with the mining pools. If there was an agreed 
procedure in emergencies, then perhaps they could have closed the pools earlier, limiting the 
damage.  
Case 6: Inputs.IO Hack (Cloud Platform) 
In 2013, hackers stole over 4,000 bitcoins through two separate attacks in the same week 
from Inputs.Io, a company that stores customersÕ cryptocurrencies in digital wallets65. This 
was possible through a breach in the cloud infrastructure. In addition, several e-mail accounts 
were compromised, leading to the attacker being able to reset the password for the Linode 
Server.  Inputs.Io did not have the funds to pay back customers in full.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the increasing use of blockchain technologies and the incidents reviewed, we 
propose a framework of best practices to reduce the chance of cyber security vulnerabilities. 
This framework provides solutions for the interactions surrounding blockchain as opposed to 
altering the technology itself. As explored in previous sections, blockchain technology itself 
is not usually compromised; instead vulnerabilities arise due to its improper use. We further 
provide security recommendations for both providers and consumers of the blockchain 
technology. 
Regulatory Compliance - Blockchain solutions are often implemented on cloud platforms, 
and we have already seen hacks due to the cloud infrastructure (see Figure 2). Stakeholders 
need to carefully investigate the risks of the cloud platform itself70, and ensure they choose an 
appropriate platform to host permissioned blockchains, especially within a regulated industry. 
Blockchain providers need to ensure their cloud infrastructures are at least compliant with 
ISO 27001 and ISO 270017. Blockchain consumers dealing with personally identifiable 
information (PII) should also ensure their providers are compliant with ISO 270018. This will 
help ensure that the necessary security controls are in place. Blockchain providers should also 
consider industrial specific compliance requirements. In the healthcare industry, platforms 
should be built with compliance to country specific acts, such HIPAA. This allows adopters 
to meet the needs of the industry more easily keeping patient data secure. In the finance 
industry, there are also platforms on offer, such as IBM Blockchain framework71, to help with 
compliance with FISMA, SOX and Gramm Bleach Bliley.  
Blockchain Providers Selection - Blockchain consumers should carefully consider platforms 
available when choosing a third-party provider.  The question they should ask is: will this 
provider help me to be compliant with the needs of my industry? Likewise, Blockchain 
providers need to have the consumer in mind by ensuring that their blockchain frameworks 
contain detailed guidance on how they can help consumers to satisfy their industrial needs. 
Good practices are the IBM and Microsoft blockchain frameworks71,72 that specify their 
country specific and industrial specific standards that they have addressed and also provide 
considerations that the consumer must undertake to avoid security breaches. In essence, a 
successful blockchain framework must inform an organisation to select a provider that meets 
all their needs.   
Routine Audits Ð Our review flagged the need for formal reviews of all smart code contracts. 
Mistakes can compromise the entire system as seen with The DAO incident58. The 
blockchain framework should contain detail of how an internal formal code review should be 
carried out73, and who should carry out the review, what experience is required to undertake 
the review and what seniority level is required for sign off. This may vary between industry 
sectors. Details should be provided on how often external reviews should take place. It is 
unrealistic for all smart code contracts to be externally audited, however all should go 
through detailed internal reviews. The framework should also state that if a code has been 
audited for a specific purpose, it should not be used for other purposes. Using the code in an 
alternative way would constitute the need for another review for the new suggested purpose. 
This would have helped mitigate the Parity Vulnerability review62  
Automation of Blockchain Incident Response - We identified the need for a formal process to 
be agreed upon by communities for incident response. In the case of the Zerocoin hack, if 
there were an automated way to inform mining pools about the incident, activities could have 
been suspended until fixed63. This example is specific to the cryptocurrency world; however, 
automation of blockchain incident response should be considered in all other industries. 
Furthermore, in the root cause analysis, it was noted that in many cases the root causes of 
hacks were not discussed or recorded. This results in a lack of ability for the wider 
blockchain community to learn from security breaches. Companies can therefore fall victim 
to the same attacks that could otherwise have been prevented. Therefore, it is recommended 
that mandatory public information sharing is necessary at the earliest opportunity. This will 
also allow other organisations adopting the technology to learn from other communities, as 
although their purpose in using the blockchain may be different, the vulnerabilities remain 
the same.  
Use of Hot Wallets and Cold Wallets - Hot wallets were identified earlier as a key risk, with 
some incidents being the result of hackers gaining access to hot wallets. Although the 
vulnerability may have been elsewhere, if cold storage had been used, the attack could have 
been mitigated. This is not to say that cold storage is completely secure, but we have seen 
many more hot wallet breaches in comparison to cold storage (see Figure 2).  Therefore, it is 
recommended that keys of value are stored using cold storage methods. It would be difficult 
to eradicate the use of hot wallets as they aid the efficiency of transactions, however the data 
stored in hot wallets should be strongly considered prior to use. It is suggested that major 
exchanges should keep most funds in cold storage10. 
End-to-end Product Life Cycle Reviews - Detailed end-to-end reviews should be part of the 
business process to try and identify vulnerabilities through risk-based scenarios. This would 
aid proactive identification of risk rather than waiting until they materialise. There is limited 
research in blockchain risk management in the product life cycle review. Experience can be 
borrowed from cyber security risk assessment (Rauter, et, al., 2016) that key blockchain risk 
factors throughout the product life cycle should be identified, measured, prioritised and 
mitigated (e.g. avoiding, minimising, transferring or containing) to an acceptable level that is 
benchmarked or predefined.  
Automated Checks - Where possible automated checks74 should be in place to ensure the 
systems and processes are working as expected. For example, in the Zerocoin incident, if they 
had noticed that total Zerocoin spend did not align with the total Zerocoin minted earlier, the 
amount stolen would have been much less (Insom, 2017). In this respect, ÔAutomated 
Management Information ReportsÕ could be designed to check such totals and send an alert 
when a mis-match is detected.     
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The Blockchain is designed to be secure and the technology has great potential benefits. 
However, through the interactions with software systems, web-based systems, clouds and 
other platforms, security risks can be introduced to Blockchain systems. It must be used 
appropriately with the use of a security framework. Currently, businesses and organisations 
operate under a lack of standards. Based on an extensive review of the existing standards and 
regulations, we identified their applicability that is connected to Blockchain. The incidents 
reviewed highlight key points that should be included in a blockchain specific framework, 
including regulatory compliance, Blockchain provider selection, the need for thorough smart 
contract code reviews and both internal and external audits, the automation of incident 
response methods and checks, appropriate use of cold storage techniques where possible and 
end-to-end product life cycle reviews and automated checks. Our intention is not to provide 
an all-encompassing framework, but to highlight ways for identifying, exploring and 
addressing risks related to Blockchain technology. This also contributes to the creation of the 
Blockchain specific security standard regarding what security concerns need to be included 
and addressed. One limitation of this work is that the derived root causes and recommended 
security solutions have not been scientifically verified or executed in experiments. Future 
work should improve on this by verifying the framework through experimentation. Future 
work will be focusing on the elaboration of the above-mentioned seven aspects within the 
framework and borrow experience from general information security area including 
regulatory compliance, risk assessment, incident response, access control, auditing and 
contingency planning.  
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APPENDIX: BLOCKCHAIN INCIDENTS AND SOURCES   
 
Table 3. List of incidents 
Incident Root Cause Source 
The DAO Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 58 
Zcoin Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 63 
Cryptoine Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 75 
Cryptothrift Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 76 
Poloniex Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 77 
Flexcoin Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 78 
Parity Application Vulnerability/Smart Contract Code Error 62 
Inputs Cloud Platform 65 
Bitcoinica Cloud Platform 79 
Black Wallet Cloud Platform 80 
Cloudminr Cloud Platform 81 
Gatecoin Cold Storage 82 
Shapeshift Insider Threat 83 
Coinsecure Insider Threat 84 
Cryptsy Insider Threat 85 
Justcoin Protocol 86 
Silk Road 2.0 Protocol 87 
Youbit Server/Infrastructure Breach 88 
Tether Server/Infrastructure Breach 89 
Bitfinex Server/Infrastructure Breach 58 
Bitpay Server/Infrastructure Breach 90 
Allcrypt Server/Infrastructure Breach 91 
Dogevault Server/Infrastructure Breach 92 
Instawallet Server/Infrastructure Breach 93 
Bitcoin7 Server/Infrastructure Breach 94 
Coincheck Server/Infrastructure Breach 95 
Nicehash Server/Infrastructure Breach 96 
Coindash Server/Infrastructure Breach 61 
Slush's Pool Server/Infrastructure Breach 97 
Bitstamp Social Engineering 98 
Bitinstant Social Engineering 99 
Bitquick Unknown 100 
Coinkite Unknown 101 
Cointrader Unknown 102 
Bips Unknown 103 
Mintpal Unknown 104 
Bid Extreme Unknown 105 
Bitomat Unknown 106 
 
 
